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Rethinking Greece: Despina Lalaki on Hellenism, statebuilding, archaeology and the “Democratic West”
Despina Lalaki is a sociologist who works in the areas of historical and cultural sociology, social theory and Modern
Greek Studies. She is particularly interested in long-term social and cultural changes, the changing modes of
consciousness, the history of the state and its ideological and cultural foundations, the role of the intellectuals. Parts
of her research results have been published in The Journal of Historical Sociology and in Hesperia, The Journal of
the American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
Despina Lalaki received her Ph.D. in Comparative Historical Sociology from The New School University in New
York. She has also studied History of Art and Architecture at SUNY-Binghamton University and Archaeology and
Art History at the University of Athens, Greece. She has taught at New York University and the A.S. Onassis
Program in Hellenic Studies. She currently teaches at CUNY-The New York City College of Technology.
She also writes for newspapers and magazines and contributes commentary to radio, TV programs and social media
on current developments in Greece (Greece in Crisis: An Interview with Despina Lalaki- Boston Occupier, The
Greek crisis as racketeering-Al Jazeera).
Despina Lalaki spoke with Rethinking Greece* about the image of antiquity in the Greek national narrative and
identity, Greek archaeology and the idea of Hellas, the transformations the notion of Hellenism underwent during
the twentieth century, the cross-cultural fertilization between Greece and the United States, Hellenism vis-à-vis
modernization and cold war politics, Greece’s international image campaigns and heritage industry, the “cradle of
democracy” as post WWII American and European construct, as well as the political imperative for social sciences
to offer critical and practical reappraisal of the EU center-periphery relationship.
Archaeological discourse seems to hold a central place in the Greek national narrative and identity. In what
terms can/should archaeologists and social scientists review such issues in the current context?
Nations are made of the stuff that archaeology produces. Archaeology itself would look very different, had it not
been born in the age of nationalism. After having for a long time been considered an aid-science to history,
archeology was quickly incorporated in the national agenda in search of origins; ethnic and racial groups were
believed to be associated with specific material cultures. In the case of Greece, archaeology provided the material
evidences, the histories and genealogies that connected the Modern Greek state with a past already sanctified in the
political and cultural imagination of the West. Most importantly, it helped to create a unified and unifying symbolic
language that was terribly important for the cultural integration of the modern nation-state and the formation of a
national identity. Upon the destruction of older social structures, classical antiquity -with the help of archaeologyprovided the necessary means for national integration, through the creation of a new type of consciousness.
The Modern Greek state, not unlike other nation-states, found in culture a way to establish the loyalty and
cooperation of the new political entity’s members. As Hobsbawm has suggested, it was in connection with the
emergence of mass politics that rulers and middle-class observers rediscovered the importance of “irrational”
elements in the life of human collectivities, in order to maintain the social fabric and the social order. In this topdown process, which worked well beyond merely enabling political consolidation and domination, archaeologists
played a decisive role in articulating an image of antiquity that is so central to the subjective idea of the nation. What
we could identify as “professional” and “policy archaeology” worked hand in hand with the Modern Greek state to
develop a body of knowledge and public policies that sanctified classical antiquity – often to the detriment of other
periods. They promoted a Helleno-centric reading of Modern Greek history, while sharing in western discourses
about the preeminence of western civilization. I think it is important that social scientists and archaeologists engage
with what we could call “critical” and what is known as “public archaeology,” if we are interested in re-examining
the foundational premises of our fields of knowledge, while also engaging with a broader audience. It is my belief
that the democratization of knowledge on the field can only come about through an intense dialogue among these
various aspects of archaeological labor. Certainly, archaeology in Greece has been slowly opening up to various
critical approaches. Institutional efforts such as the Archaeological Dialogues - an initiative by Professor Yannis

Hamilakis - that have already been warmly embraced by the academic community but also the general public,
constitute a move in such a direction.
How has the notion of Hellenism been defined in the 18th / 19st centuries? Which were the historical
circumstances that made it necessary and to which political needs did it respond? What was the role of
archaeology in its shaping?
Historical trajectories and origins matter. The continental beginnings of Greek archaeology had their roots in
Hellenism – this convoluted set of meanings and symbolic codes which allude to the importance of ancient heritage
for western civilization. Born at the intersection of Enlightenment, Romanticism and the Philhellenic frenzy of the
early 19th century, Hellenism largely expressed European fantasies about the revival of Classical Greece through a
national liberation movement. It provided Greek archaeology with a horizon of affect and meaning, the cultural
landscape against which institutions and individual actions are shaped and from which they draw their
significance. Antiquities provided the ‘hard evidence’ and material expression of the European nostalgia for an
idealized past, emancipated from the Roman and Catholic traditions and ample of symbolisms for their ideological
struggles against the old regime of ecclesiastical and secular authority. Subsequently, the modern Greek state,
established in 1830, fully engaged in the institutionalization of archaeological practices and appropriated Hellenism
to articulate a modern Greek identity as the progenitor of western civilization, while rupturing ties with its Ottoman
past and hesitantly fitting the Byzantine Orthodox tradition into a linear national narrative.
Critical approaches to the history of Greek archaeology (rooted in multiple intellectual traditions such as poststructuralism, Marxism and critical theory, and the sociology of scientific knowledge) have largely sought to
understand it as reflection and mediation of larger sociopolitical interests and ideologies, its results often harnessed
for identifiable political ends. Yet, it is important not to reduce Greek archaeology to the mirror image of these
interests and ideologies. Furthermore, provided the history of the field, one can go beyond the nation and national
ideologies as the starting point of analysis. I favor an approach that prioritizes civilization as a historical and
analytical category that focuses on the interplay between various national institutions and agents in the field, its
relational dynamics and the shifting networks of interdependent actors and institutions. Following agents of the field
around, trying to establish causal relations, and recreating the historical record, but also understanding the meanings
and ideas produced as a result of ongoing struggles and interactions, may better help us to account for the full
spectrum of debates taking place over long periods of time or archeology´s impact on the configuration of larger
cultural ‘products,’ such as that of western civilization.
Did the notion of Hellenism remain analytically relevant in the twentieth century? How were post-war
American visions of development and modernization related to Modern Greek imaginaries? What has been
the role of the Greek-American Diaspora in that context?
The social history of Hellenism, while significantly transformed, continued to unravel well beyond the nineteenth
century in the intersection of state-building, trans-national politics and market networks. It is important to remember
that state-building in Greece has never been a Greek matter alone, since the Greek cultural heritage continues to be
of great symbolic, political as well as economic significance. During the last century the idea of Hellas changed
from being employed as a critique of the effects of modern civilization – primarily informed by German visions of
self-improvement, disinterested Wissenschaft and cultural reform – to an expression of instrumental rationality,
cultural commodification and liberal democracy. Post World War I aspirations, for instance, of an international civil
society expanding through the means of culture and the free market, as conceived by influential parts of American
society, made considerable inroads in Greece, building upon the tremendous symbolic capital of antiquity.
Beyond the influences in popular culture we have paid very little, if any, attention to the processes of trans-valuation
and cross-cultural fertilization between Greece and the United States, despite the prominent role the latter has had in
the most recent political and social history of the country. The interest that the United States has taken in Greece,
especially following World War II, has not been solely on the level of “high politics” or economics, because the idea
of Hellas has had a strong hold on the relationship between the two states. In post war Greece, the American policies
of economic liberalism and social democracy – a kind of New Deal world policy – for full employment,
modernization of ruined economies, and communist containment invested symbolically as well as in economic terms

in Hellenism, while radically transforming it in the process. The rationalization and promotion of the ancient cultural
heritage, primarily via tourism, was meant to lead to economic and consequently political stability, modernization
and therefore the elimination of the communist threat. Hellenism, well removed from the romantic visions of the
nineteenth century, was now reimagined in very pragmatic terms as the country’s propeller into the future.
The work of American educational and research institutions, cultural foundations, philanthropic agencies and
organizations in Greece has been greatly understudied. During the war, complex networks of scholars and
academics, administrators, and old as well as emerging economic and cultural elites – including the Greek-American
diaspora – emerged in response to the urgency of the times. Subsequently, these networks further expanded to assist
with the reconstruction of the country and its ideological realignment. Institutions such as the American School of
Classical Studies, for instance, which I have closely studied, and its staff of archaeologists became, rather
inadvertently, central nodes in these networks, while the Greek-American diaspora, especially new wealth
entrepreneurs, constituted almost a natural pool of resources. So, regarding the contribution of the Greek-American
diaspora in the efforts for Greece’s post-war reconstruction there is still great room for in-depth research.
How did democracy become part of the “we images” and ‘‘we-feelings’ of the Modern Greek identity? How
do they relate to American and European perceptions of democracy?
“The cradle of democracy” – the way we perceive our identity as treasurers of western civilization’s political
foundations – is largely a Cold War construct that carries the imprints of modernization theory and European
hegemonic social hierarchies. Most importantly, a whole set of ideas associated with this construct, conditions and
constrains our cultural dispositions and political imagination to this day.
The struggle for democracy defined the twentieth century; democratic frameworks were really secured only in the
wake of the Second World War. Yet, there was nothing natural or inevitable about democracy in Europe, or
anywhere else for that matter, as Geoff Eley explains. It did require conflict and violent confrontations. It was not
the result of a natural process or economic prosperity, nor the inevitable byproduct of individualism or the market. It
was rather the outcome of collective and mass mobilizations on a trans-national scale. In Greece, however, there was
something inevitable about democracy. The British military intervention against the National Liberation Front,
(EAM), in favor of the old regime, the subsequent heavy-handed American political and economic interference and,
later on, the admittance into the European family were events directly related to broader socioeconomic and
geopolitical configurations which, however, carried a strong ideological imprint; the cradle of western civilization
and democracy could not be abandoned to communism or the influence of a semi-European culture.
While self-determination and equality were the basis of the republican strand of Greek nationalism, democracy
nevertheless was not prominently featured in the state’s representational agenda until after the end of the Second
World War, when the struggle between the old political establishment and the communist insurgency was still
raging. The term of Democracy itself, a rather empty signifier at the time, became a rallying cry against communism
and the Left more broadly. In the process, Hellenism was further employed to shape new ontological and
epistemological distinctions between the Democratic West and the Communist East, normalizing the postwar
political and economic status quo and offering legitimacy, first to American hegemony and later on, to the European
integration project.
It seems that Greece’s international tourism and heritage industry as well as its international image
campaigns have largely been based on Ancient Greece. Which are the underlying ideological parameters?
The image of Greece as the cradle of Western civilization and democracy was consolidated not at the excavation
site, the museum, or even the lecture hall, but in the tourist campaigns of the Greek Organization of Tourism (EOT),
in the brochures and advertisements of travel agencies, and on the Hollywood big screen. Tourism, as a mechanism
of representation, has had a profound effect on the process of objectification of national collective consciousness.
Tourism can be defined as a particular species of industry which, more than any other form of capitalist industry,
sells not only commodities, but also worlds of meaning and experience, marketed so as to create very specific and at
the same time, highly idealized representations of places, cultures, nature and people. The ideological power of such

an agency was early on identified by Ioannis Metaxas, who placed the post of Undersecretary of Press and Tourism
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. EOT, established later on, could be identified as one of the most powerful
agents in the construction of national identity in the postwar Greece. Until the 1980s, Greece was primarily
marketed to the American consumers, initially as the ‘cradle of Western civilization,’ placing emphasis on its
ancient cultural heritage and increasingly as a summer vacation destination and a retreat from the hustle and bustle
of modern civilization. As soon as the two oil crises had run their course and European consumers gained buying
power, Greece, the ‘cultural park of Europe’ as UNESCO would describe the country, would start targeting the
European market for consumers. “Greece – The Europeans’ European Vacation,” as EOT advertised in 1988, was
marketed as the preferred choice by smart travelers, while gradually shifting from a mass tourism policy to a more
locally-integrated and less invasive tourist development model.
Tourism is a way of representing the world not merely to others but to ourselves as well. Time and again Greece has
been promoted as the destination where cultural sophistication meets a landscape untouched by modernization, the
land where Western civilization took its first steps and the inhabitants maintain something of a more carefree and
simple past. Either directly and programmatically through assertion, or indirectly by implication, we have been
reproducing -and in the process internalizing- narratives that date back to the nineteenth century, while suffering the
effects of the tension between the much celebrated ancient ancestors and the indolent descendants.
According to some scholars, the current crisis revealed Europe’s ‘crypto-colonialist’ traits. What can social
sciences do for a critical / practical reappraisal of the relation between European core and European
periphery?
These scholars, notably anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, who first introduced the term, correctly suggest that
massive economic dependence has curtailed the political independence of the Modern Greek state from its inception.
Modern Greek national culture was also largely fashioned along the lines of western fantasies and expectations,
rendering Modern Greeks wanting in the process. In nineteenth century terms, one could describe this relationship as
“crypto-colonialist.” At this historical junction, however, I think it is important to talk about neoliberalism as
opposed to colonialism, or even crypto-colonialism, if we wish to better understand the evolution of the European
project during the last thirty years or so. Despite the constitutive role of colonialism in the development of
mechanisms that supported global capitalism, colonialism and neoliberal capitalism are politically distinct projects
with significantly different characteristics.
The current crisis laid bare the anti-democratic foundations of the European Union, its anti-internationalism, racism
and imperial nostalgia. What is also important to note, is that the inability to perceive alternative modes of political
and social organization beyond the onslaughts of neoliberalism under the mantle of European integration, is
intrinsically connected and closely intertwined with identities that are far from being as immanent or as
primordial as they appear. They are, instead, socially and historically grounded on configurations and events
following the Second World War; they constitute responses to the European Cold War order, fierce anticommunism, transatlantic militarism and free market economy – albeit moderated by a welfare state, destined to
succumb to the onslaughts of neoliberal capitalism. Austerity Europe would not have been possible without a set of
narratives capitalizing on misrecognized cultural cleavages between the European North and South and invented,
long internalized genealogies. In the case of Greece, the charter myth of Hellenism has been re-deployed as a
legitimizing ideology for the bourgeois Greek state as well as the western European establishment steering, once
again, Greek democracy’s course.
The political imperative for social sciences to offer critical, but also practical reappraisal of the EU center-periphery
relationship, differs for each scholarly field. Specifically for comparative historical sociology, the perspective from
which I talk, I argue that the imperative is not to provide direct answers to private or state-administrative queries
related to the crisis, but analyses rich-in-detail and interpretation, causal explanations from a macro point of view as
well as parallel investigations and comparisons. If the objective is to intervene and fight the crisis that appears to
disrupt long established social structures, institutions and organizations, or to change those structures, it is
imperative that we have a deeper understanding of the complex social processes in which this crisis is embedded.
Historical sociology is ideally positioned to seek causal relationships behind important social phenomena or to
provide explanation regarding issues such as the democratic deficit of the European Union, the rise or decline of
labor organizing or the social origins of fascism, for instance. In the process, engagement with various perspectives

in the European periphery, might lead to methodological innovation and a historical sociology that is both richer in
theory and empirical evidence.
It is, of course, the case that offering in-depth objective historical and sociological research and analysis may not be
sufficient, if social change is to be a part of social sciences’ objective. It is important, I think, that we carefully
reconsider our relations to the centers of power, as well as what our audiences are. We should bear in mind that our
scholarly practices have a strong social dimension, while our scholarly work is accountable not only to peer review
but also to the publics it serves.
*Interview by Nikolas Nenedakis and Athina Rossoglou

